Laboratoire Philosophie-Pratiques-Langues

When recalling events that one personally experienced, one often visualises the remembered scene as one originally saw it: from an internal visual perspective. Sometimes, however, one sees oneself in the remembered scene: from an external 'observer perspective'. In such cases one remembers from-the-outside. This book is about such memories. Remembering from-the-outside is a common yet curious case of personal memory: one views oneself from a perspective one seemingly could not have had at the time of the original event. How can past events be recalled from a detached perspective? How is it that the self is observed? And how can we account for the self-presence of such memories? Indeed, can there be genuine memories recalled from-the-outside? If memory preserves past perceptual content then how can one see oneself from-the-outside in memory? This book disentangles the puzzles posed by remembering from-the-outside. The book develops a dual-faceted approach for thinking about memory, which acknowledges constructive and reconstructive processes at encoding and at retrieval, and it uses this approach to defend the possibility of genuine memories being recalled from-the-outside. In so doing it also elucidates the nature of such memories and sheds light on the nature of personal memory. The book argues that field and observer perspectives are different ways of thinking about a particular past event. Further, by exploring the ways we have of getting outside of ourselves in memory and other cognitive domains, the book sheds light on the nature of our perspectival minds.

Jordi Fernández (2015) discusses the possible benefits of two types of allegedly distorted memories: observer memories and fabricated memories. Fernández argues that even when memory does not preserve the past, some memories can still provide an adaptive benefit for the subject. I explore Fernández’s claims focussing on the case of observer perspective memories. For Fernández, observer perspectives are distorted memories because they do not preserve past experience. In contrast, I suggest that observer perspectives can accurately reflect past experience: observer perspectives are not necessarily distorted memories. By looking at the complexity of the relation between remembering trauma from an observer perspective and emotional closure, I also sound a note of caution against Fernández’s assertion that observer memories of trauma can be adaptively beneficial. Finally, I suggest that because observer perspectives are not necessarily distorted, but involve a distinct way of thinking about one’s past, such memories can be epistemically beneficial.

We have the capacity to mentally project ourselves into the personal past and future. We typically see and feel these past and future events unfold before our mind’s eye, “reexperiencing” or “preexperiencing” them. This capacity is known as mental time travel (MTT). We can predict, plan, and prepare for the future based, in part, on our knowledge of the past. Often, however, we fail to give sufficient weight to future outcomes. We discount the future, seeking immediate gratification at the expense of long-term reward. It has been proposed that MTT is crucial to overcoming this tendency to discount future rewards. MTT enables us to preexperience the emotional impact of a future reward and this supports future-oriented decision-making. Yet the imagery of MTT involves distinct visual perspectives. Sometimes we visualize the event from a field perspective, seeing the scene from our own eyes. But often, the imagery of MTT involves an external observer perspective, and we see ourselves in the past or future scenario. Observer perspectives are often thought to be phenomenally and affectively dry. This creates a puzzle. If much of the imagery of MTT involves observer perspectives, then using such imagery to think about a future reward may not provide the emotional force necessary for supporting future-oriented decision-making. I examine the role that observer perspectives play in simulating the future and supporting prudent decision-making. I show that observer perspectives can involve emotional imagery and that they can therefore help us to navigate intertemporal choices.

Le présent article examine la critique-paradoxale au premier abord-qu'adresse Emmanuel Levinas à la philosophie plotinienne. Paradoxale, puisqu'elle lui reproche d'avoir manqué le sens authentique de la transcendance, alors même qu'elle développe ce sens jusqu'à ses limites-apparemment-les plus extrêmes : l'Un plotinien, en qualité de principe, est en effet séparé de ce qu'il engendre, et, à ce titre, strictement « au-delà de l'être », formule platonicienne (République VI, 509b), que Levinas, justement, fait sienne, et inscrit au coeur même de sa pensée. Il s'agira ainsi, à la lumière des textes de Plotin, d'examiner les ressorts de cette critique, de vérifier sa portée, quitte à la retourner : la pensée plotinienne ne pourrait-elle pas fournir quelque réponse aux difficultés que présente celle de Levinas, ou, du moins, cette dernière n'est-elle pas également exposée-comme toute pensée de la transcendance-aux difficultés qu'elle entend exhiber ?